The empirical evidence suggests that parents use inter vivos gifts (i.e., transfers of tangible and …nancial property) to compensate less well o¤ children whereas post mortem bequests are divided equally among siblings. We study a theoretical model assuming, …rst, that the amounts given is private information, only known to the donor and the donee, while the amounts bequeathed is public information. Second, we assume that parents care about the reputation that their bequest behavior will leave them after their death. More speci…cally, this reputation is deteriorating in the di¤erence in amounts inherited. We show that, given these assumptions, the optimal choice of altruistic parents is compensatory gifts and equal bequests.
Introduction
Empirical studies of intergenerational transfers show that inter vivos gifts tend to be compensatory while post mortem bequests are equally divided among heirs. Dunn and Phillips (1997) …nd, using US data, that gifts are compensatory; the higher earnings of a child the smaller the received gift. Most empirical studies of estate division …nd equal division; see Menchik (1988) for the U.S. and Arrondel et al. (1997) for France. 1 This is a puzzle since established models of intergenerational transfers predict that there is no di¤erence between gift and bequest behaviour. Altruistic parents will make compensatory transfers.
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In this paper we study a model of altruistic parents adding two key features: (1) Gifts and bequests di¤er because gift behaviour is private information, only known to the donor and the donee, whereas bequest behavior is public information, at least known to all heirs through the estate inventory and possibly also even common knowledge, and (2) a social norm of equal division of bequests. Because bequest behaviour is public information parents can a¤ect their post mortem reputation. We assume that while living, parents care about their future reputation and let this a¤ect their transfer behavior. In this model, the utility maximizing transfer behaviour of parents is to make compensatory gifts while dividing bequests equally.
Our assumptions about who knows what are consistent with how tax systems are designed in most industrialized countries. Only very small fractions of total tax revenue are raised by bequest and inheritance taxes even though the estate inventories make estate sizes common knowledge. An explanation often given for this is that increasing bequest and inheritance taxes would make parents shift to inter vivos gifts instead. This argument, however, assumes that it is more di¢cult to tax gifts than bequests and inheritances. This, in turn, is consistent with gifts being private information. Laitner (1997, p. 206) writes that social norms may explain why intergenerational transfers are equally divided between siblings. Equal division may curb rent-seeking behaviour of siblings competing over parental resources and also preserves peace within family lines. Wilhelm (1996) assumes that parents su¤ers from a …xed psychic cost if they deviate from equal division of post mortem bequests; a hypothesis for which he …nds some empirical support. Stark (1998) , on the other hand, considers a case where a child 1 Tomes (1981 Tomes ( , 1988 , however, …nds that bequests are compensatory. Cremer and Pestieau (1996) , in a model of altrustic parents facing moral hazard and the samaritan's dilemma, generate the prediction that gifts are equal and bequests are compensatory.
becomes more deprived if she gets less than her siblings.
3 In contrast our model (i) allows a trade-o¤ between the reputation e¤ect and the altruistic parent's compensatory ambition and (ii) makes a distinction between intergenerational transfers in the form of inter vivo gifts and post mortem bequests.
Altruistic model
Consider a mother with two unequal daughters, one rich and one poor. We study a standard altruistic model in which the mother cares equally about the daughters. Conditional on the total bequest b, we ask how the mother should divide the total bequest. We focus on situations where the mother bequeath to both daughters; b i > 0 i = r; p, where r = rich and p = poor. The mother solves
subject to b¸b r +b p and where a i is the initial resources of daughter i = r; p, such that a r > a p . The …rst order condition for an interior solution implies
The opportunity cost of increasing the bequest to one daughter is the identical reduction in bequest to the other daughter, both measured in marginal utilities of income. The mother will choose to equalise consumption opportunities between daughters. This means that she compensates the poor daughter by setting b (2) holds. This solution, which is illustrated as allocation ® in Figure 1 , is contrary to overwhelming empirical evidence that bequests are equally divided. Note that the solid line with slope 1 is the locus of equal bequest whereas the dotted line with slope 1 is the locus of equal of consumption opportunities.
Post mortem reputation
We take as our starting point that the bequest behaviour will a¤ect the reputation of the mother after she has died. Suppose that the mother cares 
about this reputation in a way such that she solves
subject to b¸b r + b p , where S is a positive constant and (b r ¡ b p ) 2 is the post mortem reputation (i.e., reputation after death). For an interior solution the …rst order condition implies
The mother now trades o¤ her wish to equalise consumption opportunities between the daughters with her desire for post mortem reputation. Even if the rich daughter is more advantaged than her sister, the mother now does not want to equalise the consumption opportunities between daughters. As long as S is …nite, b r = b p is never optimal. The optimal solution is illustrated as allocation°in Figure 2 .
However, indi¤erence curves have slope
Figure 2: The post mortem solution and the not-so compensatory solution
given our assumption that a r > a p . Now, let S ! 1. Then, by l'Hôpital's rule
for all strictly positive bequests b r ; b p , since by the same rule lim (br ¡bp)!0 br ¡bp br ¡bp = 1. Then all weight is given to reputation. so the mother cares only about how she divides her bequest and not at all about the welfare of her daughters. The indi¤erence curves are now straight lines with slope 1, where the indi¤erence curve through the origin gives the highest utility. In this extreme case, the model does not any longer provide us with a unique solution; i.e., any b r = b p = b such that b · b solves the mother's problem.
Compensatory gifts and equal bequests
In this section we add the assumption that the bequest behaviour is public information whereas as gift behaviour is private information. Then bequests, but not gifts, will a¤ect the reputation of the mother after she has died. Suppose that the mother cares about this reputation in a way such that she solves max br;bp;gr;gp
subject to b¸g r + b r + g p + b p . For an interior solution the …rst order conditions can be rearranged to
Equation ( 
so that gifts are used compensatory to equalise consumption opportunities and bequests are used to equally divide the mother's remaining wealth among daughters. However, the mother is indi¤erent between using gifts or bequests to choose her position on the equal consumption locus.
Conclusions
The empirical evidence suggests that parents use inter vivos gifts (i.e., transfers of tangible and …nancial property) to compensate less well o¤ children whereas post mortem bequests are divided equally among siblings. We study a theoretical model assuming, …rst, that the amounts given is private information, only known to the donor and the donee, while the amounts inherited is public information. Second, we assume that parents care about the reputation their bequest behavior will leave them after their death. More speci…cally, this reputation is detoriating in the di¤erence in amounts inherited. We show that, given these assumptions, the optimal choice of altruistic parents is compensatory gifts and equal bequests.
